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I. GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT OF 1994
T HE GENERAL Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA)created an eighteen-year statute of repose protecting manu-
facturers of general aviation aircraft and their components from
long-tail liability related to their products.' GARA prohibits tort
actions filed outside the limitations period that "aris[e] out of
an accident involving a general aviation aircraft" and are
"brought against the manufacturer of the aircraft or the manu-
facturer of any new component, system, subassembly, or other
part of the aircraft."2 For new aircraft, the statute of repose be-
gins on the date of delivery of the aircraft or component part to
its first purchaser, lessee, or person engaged in the business of
selling or leasing such aircraft.' GARA also provides a "rolling"
statute of repose for tort claims concerning new replacement
I General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 2, 108
Stat. 1552 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2006)).
2 Id. § 2(a).
- Id. § 2(a) (1).
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parts or new components added to the aircraft that are alleged
to have caused death, injury, or damage that begins "on the date
of completion of the replacement or addition."4
GARA's statute of repose does not apply, however, where: (1)
"the claimant pleads with specificity the facts necessary to prove
... that the manufacturer ... knowingly misrepresented . . . or
concealed or withheld from the Federal Aviation Administration
[(FAA)], required information that is material and relevant" to
the maintenance or operation of the aircraft or component
part, and that such misrepresentation, concealment, or with-
holding caused the accident; (2) the claim is being made for a
person who was a passenger for the "purposes of receiving treat-
ment for a medical or other emergency"; (3) the injured person
"was not aboard the aircraft at the time of the accident"; or (4)
the action is "brought under a written warranty enforceable
under law but for the operation" of GARA.5
A. BURToN v. TwIN COMMANDER AiRcRAFT, LLC
The plaintiff, the personal representative of seven individuals
killed in the crash of a Twin Commander Model 690C, brought
suit against Twin Commander Aircraft, LLC.7 The accident air-
craft was originally delivered in 1981, and thus fell outside the
eighteen-year statute of repose.8 The plaintiffs sought to come
under the "rolling provision" of GARA by arguing that the "Alert
Service Bulletin Upper Rudder Structural Inspection" issued by
defendant Twin Commander in April 2003 was the defective
"part."9
The plaintiff primarily relied upon the Ninth Circuit's opin-
ion in Caldwell v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp.,'0 to argue that the ser-
vice bulletin was a "new part" under GARA." In Caldwell, the
court had held that a revised flight manual, which failed to spec-
ify that the last two gallons of fuel could not be used, could be
considered a "new part" or a "defective system" under the Act."2
4 Id. § 2(a) (2).
5 Id. § 2(b).
6 221 P.3d 290 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2009), appeal docketed, 218 P.3d 921
(Wash. Oct. 1, 2009).
7 Id. at 291.
8 Id. at 292.
9 Id. at 291-92.
10 230 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2000).
11 Burton, 221 P.3d at 295.
12 Caldwell, 230 F.3d at 1157-58.
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The Court of Appeals of Washington, however, embraced the
reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Colgan Air, Inc. v. Raytheon
Aircraft Co.,'" that "a maintenance manual 'is not sufficiently sim-
ilar to a flight manual' and is not a 'part' of the aircraft for pur-
poses of the rolling provision under GARA."' 4 The court
further found the plaintiffs claim that the bulletin was the "new
part" for purposes of the statute of repose was particularly ill-
suited where his theory of liability was for failure to warn of a
defect in the airplane's rudder tip and rudder assembly-wholly
different parts than the service bulletin.'"
The Burton plaintiff also argued that Twin Commander was
not the manufacturer of the aircraft and thus was not entitled to
the protections of GARA.' 6 The Act itself does not define "man-
ufacturer."" Defendant Twin Commander Aircraft is the cur-
rent type-certificate holder for the Twin Commander Model
690C, which authorizes the defendant to manufacture the air-
craft, but it has not manufactured Model 690Cs. 1 8 In this re-
spect, the court found that Twin Commander is different than
other successor type-certificate holders who began manufactur-
ing the aircraft and have been held to be successor manufactur-
ers under GARA." Because the record was "inadequate to
determine whether Twin Commander is the 'manufacturer of
the aircraft"' and because the parties had not engaged in statu-
tory analysis, the court remanded the issue to the lower court.20
Finally, the plaintiff argued that Twin Commander had
"knowingly misrepresented, concealed, or withheld information
concerning the structural integrity of the rudder system to the
FAA" when obtaining approval to issue this service bulletin.
Particularly, the plaintiff argued that the company knew, but did
not disclose, that certain previous accidents were related, which
would have revealed to the FAA the seriousness of the problem
with the aircraft's rudder system.2 2 The Court of Appeals of
13 507 F.3d 270, 276 (4th Cir. 2007).
14 Burton, 221 P.3d at 296.
15 Id. at 296-97.
16 Id. at 291-92.
17 Id. at 297.
18 Id. at 292.
19 Id. at 297 (contrasting Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 93 Cal. Rptr.
2d 124 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), and Mason v. Schweizer Aircraft Corp., 653 N.W.2d
543 (Iowa 2002)).
20 Id. at 298.
21 Id. at 292.
22 Id. at 300.
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Washington determined that company emails presented by the
plaintiff to prove Twin Commander's knowledge were sufficient
to create a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Twin Com-
mander had engaged in misrepresentation or concealment."
B. MOYER V. TELEDYNE CONTINENTAL MOTORS, INC.2 1
As in Burton, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Moyer was
also faced with the question of whether a service bulletin is a
"new part" for purposes of the "rolling provision" of GARA."
The engine manufacturer, Teledyne Continental Motors, had is-
sued a service bulletin with instructions for continuing air wor-
thiness.2 6 More specifically, according to the plaintiffs, the
manufacturer modified its prior stance on crankcase welding in
the bulletin.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that the service bulletin was a "new part" for purposes of
GARA, quoting the lower court's reasoning: "it was not the ser-
vice bulletin that failed but the crankcase."2 " Further, "given the
continual issuance of service bulletins pertaining to a variety of
topics, 'if the statute of repose [were] triggered every time a ser-
vice bulletin was issued, the intent of GARA would be
eviscerated."' 29
The plaintiffs also alleged knowing misrepresentation to or
concealment from the FAA.so They argued that because
Teledyne Continental Motors wanted to get into the business of
remanufactured and factory-overhauled engines, it had reversed
its stance on crankcase welding without adequate testing.3 1 The
court found that, even if taken as true, these allegations did not
establish the scienter required by the statute. 2
The court also addressed an interesting issue of personal juris-
diction related to defendant DivCo, Inc. DivCo was a repair
shop in Oklahoma that worked on the crankshafts in the en-
23 Id. at 300.
24 979 A.2d 336 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).
25 Id. at 342, 343. This case arose out of the fatal crash of a Beech V36B on an
island in the Delaware River. Id. at 339.
26 Id. at 343.
27 Id. at 344.
28 Id. at 344-45.
2 Id. at 344 (alteration in original).
30 Id. at 345.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 346.
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gines of the accident aircraft. 3 The company's only presence in
Pennsylvania was through its website.3 4 The court noted that
the standard in the Third Circuit is that "the defendant must
clearly be doing business through its web site in the forum state,
and the claim must relate to or arise out of use of the web site."3
DivCo's website allowed customers to obtain general informa-
tion and to ascertain the status of their crankcases, but it could
not accommodate sales or orders. 6 The court held that this
type of contact was insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction
in Pennsylvania.
C. HETZER-YOUNG v. PRECISION AiRMOTIVE CoRP.38
The plaintiffs, representatives of the decedents in the crash of
a Grumman American AA-5 in Ohio, claimed that the aircraft's
carburetor and muffler had failed due to defects in these com-
ponents.3" The respective manufacturers of the carburetor and
muffler each successfully argued for summary judgment in the
trial court, claiming that GARA's statute of repose barred the
plaintiffs' claims.4 0
The plaintiffs did not dispute that the carburetor on the acci-
dent aircraft, manufactured by Marvel-Schebler, a division of
Borg Warner Corp.,41 was installed outside of the statute of re-
pose,4 2 but argued that the statute did not apply because, under
GARA, the carburetor's manufacturer had "knowingly misrepre-
sented" a problem with the carburetor to the FAA.4 3 The carbu-
retor manufacturer (in the forms of product-line successor Facet
Aerospace Products Co. and then later, Defendant Precision Air-
motive Corp.) had disclosed to the FAA that there was a prob-
lem -with the composite floats in their carburetors and
recommended that they be replaced with metal floats.44 This
3 Id. at 348, 349.
3 Id. at 349-51.
3 Id. at 350.
36 Id. at 350-51.
3 Id. at 351.
38 921 N.E.2d 683 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009).
3 Id. at 686-87.
40 Id. at 689.
41 Defendants in the lawsuit were product-line successor Precision Airmotive
Corp. and the manufacturer of the engines that used the carburetor, Lycoming
Engines. Id. at 687.
42 Id. at 695.
43 Id.
- Id. at 688.
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disclosure, according to the plaintiffs, included a knowing mis-
representation about the nature of the problem with the com-
posite floats."5 Specifically, they claimed that the manufacturer
blamed the problem with the float on the improper use of auto-
motive fuels rather than on the real cause, an "open-cell" defect
in the composite."
With regard to the muffler, the plaintiffs argued that the stat-
ute of repose did not apply at all. Although the accident air-
craft's original muffler was installed outside the statute of
repose, the plaintiffs alleged that it had been replaced by an-
other muffler manufactured by Defendant Elano Corp. (which
later merged with Defendant Unison Industries) within the rele-
vant eighteen-year period.47
The Ohio Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs had raised
a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether a misrepre-
sentation regarding the floats had occurred.4 8 Likewise, the
court agreed that the manufacturer had a duty to disclose the
nature of the defect.49 Yet, the court affirmed the summary
judgment for the manufacturer because the plaintiffs had failed
to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the alleged
misrepresentation caused the accident.o
The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary
judgment with respect to the muffler manufacturer, however,
concluding that an entry in the aircraft's maintenance log stat-
ing that the muffler was replaced in 1987 was sufficient to create
a genuine issue of material fact even though the muffler was
stamped "04-74" (the year of the aircraft's manufacture)." The
court clarified, though, that once the manufacturer had shown
that the original muffler had been installed outside the repose
period, the plaintiffs bore the burden of showing that the muf-
fler was a replacement.5 2
45 Id. at 695-96.
46 Id.
4 Id. at 687.
48 Id. at 697-98.
4 Id. at 698.
50 Id. at 699.
51 Id. at 694-95.
52 Id. at 688-89.
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D. STEWART V. PRECISION AiRMOTIVE LLC 3
In Stewart, the Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia ad-
dressed the same issue that the Ohio Court of Appeals faced in
Hetzer-Young regarding the Marvel Schebler carburetors. The
Pennsylvania trial court issued two similar opinions-one ad-
dressing defendant Lycoming Engines Division's motion for
summary judgment5 4 and the other addressing defendant Air-
motive's "substantially similar" motion."
Like the Ohio Court of Appeals, the Pennsylvania court con-
cluded that there were sufficient issues of material fact regard-
ing whether the defendants had made knowing
misrepresentations to or concealed relevant information from
the FAA to preclude summary judgment. 6 Unlike the Ohio
court, the Pennsylvania court found that the plaintiffs had
presented sufficient evidence of causation to avoid summary
judgment on their claims."
The decision on Precision Airmotive's motion also addressed
whether Precision Airmotive could be held liable as a "manufac-
turer" under GARA.58 According to the court, Precision Airmo-
tive did not have successor liability for the carburetor and was
not subject to GARA's "rolling" provision." But, as the holder
of the "Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA) certificate for the
Marvel Schebler carburetor product line," it did "qualify as a
manufacturer within the meaning of the knowing concealment
exception."60
E. Avco CoRp. v. NORT'
Avco Corporation brought a declaratory judgment action in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont against the
widow of a pilot who died when his aircraft, which had engines
manufactured by Avco's Lycoming Engines Division, crashed in
53 No. 003200, 2009 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 263, at *1 (Phila. Co. Ct. Com.
Pl. Dec. 10, 2009); No. 003200, 2009 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 246, at *1 (Phila.
Co. Ct. Corn. Pl. Oct. 5, 2009).
54 Stewart, 2009 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 246.
55 Stewart, 2009 Phila. Ct. Corn. Pl. LEXIS 263.
56 Stewart, 2009 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 246, at *12; Stewart, 2009 Phila. Ct.
Corn. Pl. LEXIS 263, at *9-12.
57 Stewart, 2009 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 263, at *12.
58 Id. at *4-5.
59 Id. at *4.
6o Id. at *5.
61 No. 08-27, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18778, at *1 (D. Vt. Mar. 11, 2009).
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Vermont.12 Avco sought a declaration that GARA's eighteen-
year statute of repose barred any claims that the widow might
have related to her husband's death despite that she had not yet
brought suit on any such claim. 3
The district court dismissed the claim for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, finding that the action did not present an actual
case or controversy." Avco based its claim for declaratory judg-
ment on a notice of inspection of the accident aircraft's engines
from "an attorney who specializes in aircraft accident litiga-
tion."6 6 Avco further alleged that "the attorney or his law firm
has given notice of inspection to Lycoming more than sixteen
times, and in every case" the attorney filed suit following inspec-
tion.66 The district court held that while "[a] specific and con-
crete threat of litigation can establish a justiciable
controversy,"6' the mere fact that an attorney who specializes in
aviation litigation invited Lycoming to an inspection of the en-
gines does not establish such a threat."
II. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) pro-
tects foreign governments, as well as their agencies, instrumen-
talities, and entities qualifying as organs of the state, from suit in
the United States unless one of several FSIA statutory exceptions
applies." The exceptions in FSIA provide the "sole basis for ob-
taining jurisdiction over a foreign state."7 o Important excep-
tions include the commercial activity exception7 ' and the
exception, with some limitations, for "an act of torture, extraju-
dicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision
of material support or resources . . . for such an act."72 A for-
eign government can also waive its immunity "explicitly or by
62 Id. at *1.
63 Id. at *2.
64 Id. at *16.
65 Id. at *2.
- Id. at *2-3.
67 Id. at *11.
- Id. at *11-12.
69 Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1602-1605 (2006)).
70 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434
(1989).
71 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2).
72 Id. § 1605(a) (7).
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implication."7 3 FSIA was amended in 2008 to make it easier for
parties to collect on judgments obtained under the state-spon-
sored-terrorism exception.
A. BUTLER V. Sux-ioI Co. 75
The plaintiffs, the pilot injured in the crash of a Sukhoi SU-29
aircraft and his wife, had previously sued Sukhoi Design Bureau
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida for
damages related to the crash, and that court had entered a de-
fault judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.7' The plaintiffs subse-
quently filed a second suit in the same court to enforce this
judgment against Sukhoi Design Bureau and alleged successors-
in-interest Sukhoi Company, United Aircraft Manufacturing
Corporation, Irkut Corporation, Sukhoi Civil Aircraft, and the
Russian Federation. In the second case, the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants "were a foreign state and/or instrumentali-
ties or agencies of a foreign state not entitled to immunity under
the FSIA."7 The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the new de-
fendants "were jointly and severally liable for the [default] judg-
ment as successors in interest to and/or alter-egos of [Sukhoi
Design Bureau].""
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under FSIA, which
the district court denied on the ground that the plaintiffs "were
entitled to discovery on the 'jurisdictional issues' they had
raised.80 Noting that a denial of sovereign immunity under FSIA
is an appealable final order, the Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit exercised jurisdiction over the defendants' immedi-
ate appeal.8
The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction, even to allow limited jurisdictional
discovery,8 2 as the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of
establishing a prima face case that their claim fell under an ex-
73 Id. § 1605(a) (1).
74 Pub. L. No. 110-181, tit. X, § 1083(a)(1), 122 Stat. 338 (2008) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A).
75 579 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2009).
76 Id. at 1309-10.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1310.
79 Id.
so Id. at 1310-11.
81 Id. at 1311.
12 Id. at 1312.
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ception to FSIA immunity." The court stated that the plaintiffs
had failed to articulate the basis for the application of any spe-
cific FSIA exception; and particularly noted that the plaintiffs'
allegations that the defendants were "alter-egos" of Sukhoi De-
sign Bureau were insufficient to establish any exception." The
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they did not need to
establish the applicability of an FSIA exception because they
were merely seeking to enforce their prior judgment, noting in-
stead that the second action sought "a new judgment in a sepa-
rate cause of action against appellants."85 Thus, the plaintiffs
bore anew the burden of establishing the prima face case of an
applicable FSIA exception." Because there were no factual alle-
gations that would fall under any FSLA exception, there was
nothing to be verified by limited jurisdictional discovery." The
Eleventh Circuit remanded the case with directions for immedi-
ate dismissal of the claims."
B. CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS LONDON v. LIBYA"
The Libyan Claims Resolution Act (LCRA) was signed into
law on August 4, 2008.90 The LCRA provides Libya with immu-
nity to suits in the United States brought by plaintiffs of any na-
tionality, overriding the exceptions to FSIA.9 ' FSIA was signed
into law in conjunction with a Claims Settlement Agreement en-
tered into by the United States and Libya.9 2 The Settlement
Agreement was entered "in order to 'terminate permanently all
pending suits . . . [and] preclude any future suits' in United
States or Libyan courts arising from terrorist acts, including air-
craft hijacking and hostage-taking, which occurred prior to June
30, 2006."" It created a $1.5 billion settlement fund."
83 Id. at 1312-13.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1313.
86 Id. at 1312-13.
87 Id. at 1313.
88 Id. at 1314-15. Further, according to the court of appeals, the district court
failed to engage in a balancing of the need for limited jurisdictional discovery to
establish an FSIA exception with the need to protect a legitimate claim to immu-
nity from discovery. Id. at 1314.
89 Nos. 06-731, 08-504, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1247, at *1 (D.D.C.Jan. 6, 2010).
90 Pub. L. No. 110-301, 122 Stat. 2999 (2008).
91 Id. § 5(a) (1) (A); see also Certain Underwriters, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1247, at
*9-10.
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The plaintiffs in Certain Underwriters had pending actions at
the time of the LCRA which they conceded fell under the Settle-
ment Agreement. 5 Retroactivity was not an issue "because Con-
gress has made clear its intent to apply the provisions of the
LCRA to events prior to June 30, 2006."'6 The plaintiffs sug-
gested that the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
should nonetheless "retain jurisdiction over the case until it is
clear that an alternate forum can provide relief for their
claims."9 7 The court rejected the request, noting that "the juris-
dictional issue is dispositive.""
III. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the sovereign im-
munity of the United States and authorizes suits against the fed-
eral government for money damages for "injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment.""
The government may be held liable for negligence "in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances."100
A. DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
The FTCA includes several exceptions to its general waiver of
sovereign immunity, including one commonly known as the
"discretionary function exception."101 Under this exception, the
United States retains its sovereign immunity for conduct involv-
ing the "exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government." 0 2 This exception
applies to conduct "discretionary in nature," i.e., "involv[ing] an
element of judgment or choice."10 Further, that judgment
must be "of the kind that the discretionary function exception
9 Id. at *13.
96 Id. at *12-13, n.8.
9 Id. at *13-14.
98 Id. at *14.
- 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006).
'00 Id.
10 See id. § 2680.
102 Id. § 2680(a).
103 United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991).
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was designed to shield," i.e. decisions that are "susceptible to
policy analysis.""o'
1. Supinski v. United States1 os
The personal representative of two passengers killed in the
crash of a Cessna 182 aircraft after an aborted landing attempt
at the Spirit of St. Louis Airport brought an action against the
United States alleging "that the United States was negligent in
issuing an airman's certificate to the airplane's pilot."106 The
pilot had received his temporary airman's certificate twenty-two
days prior to the crash; he received his endorsement to fly the
Cessna 182 two days before the crash.10 The fatal flight was
likely the pilot's "first night-time solo in a high-performance
aircraft." 08
Shortly before the accident-pilot's graduation from flight
school, his primary instructor informed the school's owner and
its chief flight instructor that although the accident-pilot "was
completing all required components of every lesson and was be-
ginning to meet all standards to pass the upcoming practical
test," in comparison with her other students, she found it more
difficult to get him to conform to her expectations.0 9 In partic-
ular, the accident-pilot "balked at reading the preflight checklist
out loud," and his instructor "felt that he was only doing so in
order to pass the lessons." 10 The instructor was told to make
sure that the accident-pilot "met all the lesson standards" and to
reduce her concerns to writing, which she did in an email that
she sent several days later.1"'
The accident-pilot graduated from the flight school.1 1 2 Al-
though he failed his first practical test with a designated pilot-
examiner, he received further training and passed the test on a
second try two days later."' Between these two tests, the FAA's
Principal Operations Inspector (POI) assigned to the flight
school made an unannounced visit to the school."' During the
104 Id. at 322, 325.
105 No. 07-963, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120860, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 29, 2009).
10 Id. at *1-2.
107 Id. at *2, *8.
10 Id. at *2.
109 Id. at *3.
110 Id. at *3-4.
II Id. at *4.
112 Id. at *5.
us Id. at *5-6, *8-9.
114 Id. at *7.
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visit, the owner of the flight school showed the POI the flight
instructor's email regarding her concerns about the accident-
pilot's "attitude toward flying."' 15 The owner also told the POI
that the owner had met with the student "to discuss his progress
and to inform him of what was required of him."' 16 The plain-
tiffs claimed that the POI was negligent for not initiating an in-
vestigation into the student-pilot at that point. 1 7
The district court granted summary judgment for the United
States on the ground that the P01's decision not to initiate an
investigation into the student-pilot was a discretionary one, and
thus, it falls within the discretionary function exception to the
waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the IFTCA.'11 As to
the first requirement of the discretionary function exception-
that the challenged conduct be discretionary-the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff had pointed to no regulation or rule
that constrained the POI's discretion.' 1 Furthermore, the court
concluded that "[w]hen confronted with the information in
[the instructor]'s email, [the P01] was clearly called upon to
exercise judgment and select among a number of choices that
were available to him. "120
The district court also determined that the second require-
ment of the discretionary function exception was met: "The
judgment at issue-what action to take in response to informa-
tion regarding a student pilot-is also of the type that the discre-
tionary function exception is designed to shield."1 2 ' This is so,
the court found, because " [t] he FAA must balance the ultimate
goal of air safety against the reality of finite agency resources."1 2 2
2. Collins v. United States 1 2 3
This was one of several cases arising out of the mid-air colli-
sion of two small planes approaching Waukegan Regional Air-
port, a Visual Flight Rules (VFR) airport.124 The plaintiffs
alleged that the United States was negligent for "failing to install
115 Id. at *7-8.
116 Id. at *8.
117 Id. at *14,
"1 Id. at *15-16.
119 Id. at *18-19.
120 Id.
121 Id. at *19.
122 Id.
123 564 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2009).
124 Id. at 833.
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radar at the Waukegan airport."' 5 The Seventh Circuit held
that the decision about what equipment to install at the airport
was protected by the discretionary function exception to the
United States' waiver of sovereign immunity.12 6 "The prioritiza-
tion of demands for government money is quintessentially a dis-
cretionary function."' 2 7 It was irrelevant to the analysis that the
FAA had installed the system that the plaintiffs argued should
have been installed at Waukegan Regional Airport at certain
other VFR airports at the request of specific members of
Congress. 128
The plaintiffs also alleged that the United States was liable for
the negligence of the air traffic controller in Waukegan Re-
gional Airport's tower. 129 The FAA had contracted out the air
traffic control services for this tower to a private company.3 o
The court reaffirmed a previous decision that controllers at con-
tract towers are not employees of the United States for purposes
of the FCA.13 1
The Seventh Circuit also reaffirmed its minority position that
the applicability of one of the FTCA's exceptions to the United
States' waiver of sovereign immunity does not raise a jurisdic-
tional issue.' 3 2
3. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. United States'33
The insurers of a twin-engine aircraft that crashed in southern
Georgia brought suit under the FTCA to recover for damage to
the aircraft.'13  They alleged that the National Weather Service
had negligently failed to issue a Significant Meteorological In-
formation (SIGMET) warning indicating that clear air turbu-
lence (CAT) was occurring or was expected to occur.'3 5 The
United States raised the discretionary function exception to its
waiver of sovereign immunity. 3 6
125 Id. at 835.
126 Id. at 838-40.
127 Id. at 839.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 838.
130 Id.
131 Id. (citing Alinsky v. United States, 415 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 2005)).
132 Id. at 837.
133 562 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2009).
134 Id. at 1298.
135 Id. at 1298-99.
136 Id. at 1299.
300 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [75
The insurers argued that issuing the SIGMET was non-discre-
tionary, relying on a provision of the National Weather Service's
manual for meteorologists. 33 The Eleventh Circuit held that
the provision relied upon by the insurers required that a
SIGMET be issued "once the meteorologists determine that se-
vere CAT is occurring or is likely to occur. However, the under-
lying determination of whether severe CAT is occurring is
discretionary. "138 Furthermore, "weather forecasts are the type
of policy decisions that the discretionary function exception
protects from liability . . . . These policy concerns include the
cost and budgetary policy considerations in forecasting and the
dangers of over warning."13
B. WEATHER BRIEFINGS
1. Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp. 40
The pilot-owner of a Cirrus SR-22 and his passenger were
both killed when the aircraft crashed in Minnesota. 1 4 1 The de-
cedents' trustees brought suit against Cirrus, the manufacturer
of the aircraft, in Minnesota state court under theories that in-
cluded failure to properly design the aircraft and failure to
properly instruct the pilot-owner in its operation.14 2 Cirrus then
brought a third-party action against two flight service station
(FSS) specialists alleging, inter alia, negligent failure to ade-
quately advise of weather conditions and forecasts. 14 3 The
United States was substituted as the third-party defendant in
place of the FSS specialists, and the case was removed to federal
court. '
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's grant of sum-
mary judgment for the United States on the grounds that
neither specialist had acted negligently and likewise affirmed
the remand to state court.14 5 According to the Eighth Circuit,
13 Id. at 1298-99.
138 Id. at 1300. According to the court, "distinguishing between moderate and
severe air turbulence, requires subjective evaluation by the meteorologist. The
meteorologist must weigh a number of factors and a range of available data." Id.
This exercise of "judgment satisfies the first part of the discretionary function
test." Id.
139 Id.
140 581 F.3d 737 (8th Cir. 2009).






the applicable articulation of the FSS specialist's duty was the
following: "FSS specialists have a duty to provide pilots with an
accurate and complete summary of the relevant weather infor-
mation.""' The court further pointed out, however, that this
duty does not mean that a specialist "need [s] to recite verbatim
the contents of every weather report before him.""' Indeed "a
verbatim recitation would likely overwhelm a pilot with informa-
tion, thereby confusing rather than clarifying the prevailing
weather conditions" and "would make FSS specialists superflu-
ous, since the rote recitation of weather reporting information
could probably be accomplished more effectively through the
use of a computer or automated phone system."' 4 8 Rather, the
court explained, the duty "means that the specialist must pro-
vide a complete synthesis or summary of the relevant weather
information. Inevitably, therefore, some information will be left
out. However, as a synthesis, it must be 'accurate and complete'
with regards to the information that would appropriately be in-
cluded in a summary report."" 9
The court concluded that the FSS station specialist that the
pilot called fulfilled his duty to convey an Airmen's Meteorologi-
cal Information (AIRMET) calling for "[o]ccasional ceiling be-
low a thousand feet/visibility below 3 miles" when he conveyed
that there was "an AIRMET for the area warning of 'the poten-
tial for some [instrument flight rule (IFR) conditions].'"150 The
court explained: "Every VFR pilot should be familiar with the
VFR cutoffs, and it would be gratuitous and counter-productive
to demand that FSS specialists reiterate those cutoffs during
every VFR weather briefing."'5 1 The court also concluded that
the FSS specialist's use of the phrase "potential for" adequately
conveyed the forecast for "occasional" IFR conditions. 15 2 As the
court noted, "occasional" is defined by the FAA as "a greater
than 50% probability of a phenomenon occurring, but for less
than 1/2 the forecast period."1 5 3 The FSS specialist's "warning
of the 'potential for' IFR along [the pilot]'s route sufficiently
conveyed the AIRMET's warning of a greater than 50% chance
146 Id. at 743.
147 Id. at 744.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 744-45.
151 Id. at 744.
152 Id. at 745.
153 Id.
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of IFR conditions for less than half the time between 2:45 a.m.
and 9:00 a.m. over the area covered by the AIRMET."1 5 4
Similarly, the FSS specialist met his duty when he conveyed
the forecast for the airport of origination to include "'occa-
sional lower stratus [clouds] and possible light snow' through
6:00 a.m."'5 ' The FSS specialist was not required to convey spe-
cific ceilings listed in an Area Forecast which covered several
states, "given that the forecast did not predict ceiling levels be-
low 1,000 feet." 15 6
The pilot also sought an "abbreviated briefing" from a second
FSS specialist.1 5 7 The court concluded that the following stan-
dards applied to an abbreviated briefing:
An abbreviated briefing intended to update a prior briefing
should be focused, "to the extent possible, [on] appreciable
changes in the meteorological and aeronautical conditions since
the previous briefing." If the pilot requests specific information
only, the specialist must provide that information, and in addi-
tion must "inform the pilot of the existence of any adverse condi-
tions," "reported or forecast."1 5 s
In this case, the pilot sought an update briefing, the current
conditions at the destination airport, and any pilot reports. 1 5 9
The court concluded that:
[The FSS specialist] was required to inform [the pilot] of any
significant changes in forecast or current conditions that arose
since his last briefing, to describe the current conditions [at the
destination airport], to inform [the pilot] of any relevant pilot
reports, and to describe any adverse conditions that were present
or forecast [along the proposed route] or reported in any pilot
reports. 6 0
Judged by this standard, the court found that the briefing met,
and exceeded, the requirements."'
Finally, the court held that neither FSS specialist had a duty to
provide a "Visual Flight Not Recommended" (VNR) warning.16 2




157 Id. at 746.
158 Id. at 746 (citations omitted).
159 Id.
10 Id. at 746-47.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 748.
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viding an abbreviated briefing might be required to provide a
VNR warning. 163
Affirming the district court's remand of the case to state
court, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court had
not abused its discretion in remanding the remaining claims.'64
In particular, it noted that while the district court had the dis-
cretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a case after
the dismissal of all federal claims, "[w] here, as here, resolution
of the remaining claims depends solely on a determination of
state law, the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction." 65
Further, the district court had not yet addressed any of the state
law claims during the time that it had jurisdiction over the
case.1 6 6
After remand to the state court, a jury found the pilot 25% at
fault for the crash, Cirrus Design Corp. 37.5% at fault, and Uni-
versity of North Dakota Aerospace Foundation (which inter-
vened as a defendant once the case was remanded) 37.5% at
fault.' 7 It awarded $7.4 million to the trustees for the passenger
and $12 million to the trustees for the pilot.1 6 8
C. NEGLIGENCE
1. Wojciechowicz v. United States'6 1
The case arose out of the crash of a Cessna Conquest into
high terrain near the El Yunque mountain peak in the Carib-
bean National Forest in Puerto Rico during a VFR flight. 70 The
pilot and four passengers were killed."' The survivors of the
decedents, the owner of the aircraft, and the aircraft's insurer
sued the United States, alleging that the United States' air traffic
163 Id.
164 Id. at 749.
165 Id. (quoting Farris v. Exotic Rubber & Plastics of Minn., Inc., 165 F. Supp.
2d 916, 919 (D. Minn. 2001)).
16 Id. at 749.
167 Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P., $7.4 Million Jury Verdict on behalf
of a Widow and Her Children for the Wrongful Death of a 51 Year Old Man





169 582 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2009).
170 Id. at 61.
171 Id.
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controller had acted negligently.7 2 The First Circuit affirmed
the district court's judgment for the United States.1 73
The appellants conceded that the pilot had been negligent.' 7
They maintained, however, that the air traffic controller was also
at fault for "fail [ing] to separate the flight from El Yunque peak
by at least three miles, which they claim is required by [para-
graph] 5-5-9 of the [Air Traffic Control Manual]." The air-
craft had last appeared on radar 4.7 miles from El Yunque
peak.17 6 The district court determined that paragraph 5-5-9 did
not apply to VFR flights but only to IFR flights, and that even if
it did apply to VFR flights, the controller did not violate that
provision because the last radar hit appeared well before the
three-miles mentioned in paragraph 5-5-9.177
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reiterated that the
law in the First Circuit
is that the [Air Traffic Control Manual] is not a statute or a regu-
lation but an internal FAA guideline issued to FAA controllers,
which governs their conduct. As such, under our case law the
[Air Traffic Control Manual] is merely an indication of the stan-
dard of care. Further, we treat "substantial" failures to adhere to
the [Air Traffic Control Manual] guidelines as "persuasive as an
indication of a lack of due care."' 8
The court "reject[ed] the argument . .. that any violation [of
the Air Traffic Control Manual] would be negligence per se."17 9
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit did not decide
whether paragraph 5-5-9 of the Air Traffic Control Manual ap-
plies to VFR flights.8 0 Instead, it found no clear error in the
district court's conclusion that "a reasonable controller, given
the facts of this case, would not have separated the flight at (or
before) 4.7 miles," the last point at which the control had con-
tact with the aircraft, even assuming that the three-mile separa-
tion requirement applied to VFR aircraft."8 " This was so
"because it was more reasonable for the controller at that point
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 63.
175 Id. at 63-64 (discussing the FAA Air Traffic Control Manual, FAA Order
7110.65M).
176 Id. at 63.
177 Id. at 65.
178 Id. at 64 (citation omitted).
179 Id. at 68.
180 Id. at 66.
181 Id. at 69.
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to rely on the VFR pilot, who, the controller could assume, was
complying with his duties to see and avoid terrain and obstacles
and to maintain VFR-minimum visibility."18 2 The appellate
court added that "[t] here is no serious contention that the pilot
did not know where El Yunque was. In contrast, [the controller]
did not then know the plane's course or altitude or whether it
was approaching or turning away from the obstruction, El
Yunque.
The appellate court also found no clear error in the district
court's determinations that there was no causal connection be-
tween the alleged separation failure and the crash and that the
accident was not foreseeable to the controller.1 8 1 "The [district]
court supportably found the cause of the crash was not that the
flight came closer than three miles to the radar tower on El Yun-
que or that it was flying in high terrain, but that the pilot flew
into a cloud in violation of FAA regulations."1 8 5 Further, it was
not foreseeable to the air traffic controller that a VFR pilot
would "fly[ ] into a cloud while traversing rugged, rising terrain
at low altitude and high speed.""1 8
The appellate court similarly affirmed the district court's con-
clusion that the air traffic controller breached no duty to pro-
vide a proximity to terrain warning under paragraph 2-1-6 of the
Air Traffic Control Manual."8 The analysis of whether a con-
troller has a duty "to issue a safety alert turns on the information
available to the controller."1 8 8 In this case, the controller "only
had information on the flight's altitude above sea level; he had
no information about the elevation of the surrounding terrain,
the aircraft's altitude over the ground, or its proximity to any
terrain or obstacles (aside from its distance from the tower on El
Yunque) .... A VFR pilot flying in a sparsely populated area
may fly close to the ground and below the altitude of surround-
ing terrain, so long as minimum visibility is maintained.""'
The appellants also advanced the theory that the San Juan




185 Id. at 70.




189 Id. (citing FAA General Operating and Flight Rules, 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.119(c),
91.155(a) (2009)).
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(CERAP) "failed to train and test [the controller] on significant
terrain areas and obstructions as required by a curriculum con-
tained in the FAA's Air Traffic Technical Training Order." 90
With such training, they maintained, the controller "would have
issued a safety alert to [the pilot], and this alert would have re-
sulted in avoidance of the crash.""'1
The First Circuit likewise found no clear error in the district
court's findings related to the adequacy of the controller's train-
ing, even presuming FAA training guidelines required training
other than what had been provided.19 2 The district court ac-
cepted the controller's testimony that he was familiar with the
location of El Yunque top and the surrounding mountains. 1 3
The training discussed in the FAA training order would not
change "the fact that [the controller] only knew the aircraft's
elevation above sea level rather than its elevation above the
ground" due to the lack of terrain information on his scope,
"and the fact that he had no reason not to presume that [the
pilot] was complying with VFR flight procedures."194
2. Kelley v. United States'
This case arose out of the crash of a Cessna 72R airplane at a
small, private airport in Prince George's County, Maryland."
The aircraft crashed during its second approach at the uncon-
trolled airport.' 7 After being unable to land on this second ap-
proach, the aircraft performed a circling maneuver to try to
land from the opposite direction.9 8 When it failed to land on
this pass as well, the aircraft began to climb and bank left, at
which time it crashed.199 The two pilots were killed and were
not parties to the action.2 0 0
190 Id. at 64.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 65. The district court also found no violation of FAA Order 3120.4J,
an FAA operating manual that "sets forth a national curriculum for training con-
trollers." Id. The court of appeals did not reach this issue, affirming on other
grounds. Id. at 71 n.16.
193 Id. at 71.
194 Id. (citing Wojciechowicz v. United States, 576 F. Supp. 2d 241, 259-60
(D.P.R. 2008)).
195 No. 08-31, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48011, at *1 (E.D. Va. Mar. 26, 2009).
196 Id. at *1-2.
197 Id. at *19.
198 Id.
199 Id.
20o Id. at *2.
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The plaintiffs, a passenger who sustained serious injury in the
crash and her husband, alleged air traffic controller negli-
gence.o1 Specifically, they alleged that the air traffic controller:
(1) [F]ail[ed] to provide [the flight] with available weather re-
ports from Andrews Air Force Base;
(2) [F]ail[ed] to suggest that [the flight] hold or divert to an-
other airport rather than attempt a landing at Freeway;
(3) [F]ail[ed] to advise [the flight] when it deviated from its as-
signed altitude;
(4) [F]ail[ed] to maintain radio communication with [the
flight] during its second approach;
(5) [F]ail[ed] to issue a safety alert during [the flight]'s second
approach; and
(6) [F]ail[ed] to instruct [the flight] to follow missed approach
procedures following the second missed approach.202
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
granted the United States' motion for summary judgment. 203
The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the air traf-
fic controller had a duty to provide weather information from
an airport that was neither the flight's destination nor along the
flight's route, absent a request from the pilot.20 4 The court fur-
ther concluded that failure to provide such weather information
was not a proximate cause of the crash. 2 05 The court noted that
the weather at Andrews Air Force Base did not materially differ
from the weather provided by the air traffic controller or from
the weather that the pilot himself observed on his first approach
at the destination airport.2 0 6 The testimony of the plaintiffs' ex-
pert finding a causal link between the failure to provide the
weather and the crash did not create a genuine issue of material
fact. 20 7 The court noted: "[w] hile expert opinions may often sat-
isfy a non-moving party's obligation to raise a triable issue of
201 Id.
202 Id. at *25.
203 Id. at *3.
204 Id. at *31.
203 Id. at *37-38.
206 Id. at *32. As the aircraft began its first approach, the air traffic controller
relayed that weather at nearby-DCA had decreased to 1.5 miles with broken cloud
ceilings at 600 AGL. Id. at *29. After his first attempted approach, the pilot
"reported visibility of 1 mile, broken clouds between 600 and 700 MSL (432-532
AGL) and some additional scattered clouds." Id. at *30.
207 Id. at *36-37.
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fact, a speculative theory of causation, even though endorsed by
an expert, does not.""o'
Similarly, the court found, as a matter of law, that the control-
ler had no duty to suggest that the flight divert or enter a hold-
ing pattern.20o Noting that the "[d]etermination that existing
weather/visibility is adequate for approach landing is the re-
sponsibility of the pilot/aircraft operator,"2 1 0 the court stated:
There is no evidence in the record that suggests that [the pilot]
thought he was at risk or that he had inadequate weather infor-
mation for the purposes of deciding whether to land, divert or
hold. There is also no evidence that [the pilot] ever suggested to
[the controller] that he had any doubts about whether he should
attempt the second missed approach or that weather conditions
were too severe for landing."2 1
The court likewise rejected the plaintiffs' theory that the con-
troller should have issued notifications to the pilot of brief alti-
tude deviations earlier in the flight.2 1 2 Any such failure2 1 3 was
not a proximate cause of the accident.214
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' theories that the con-
troller should have maintained the flight on the air traffic con-
trol frequency during and after the second approach rather
than transferring it to the local common traffic advisory fre-
quency, and should have then issued safety alerts and instruc-
tions during the second approach.2 15  Relying on the
Aeronautical Information Manual, the court characterized the
transfer to the common traffic advisory frequency as "neces-
208 Id. at *35.
20o Id. at *40.
210 Id. at *39 (quoting FAA Order 7110.65R, 1 4-7-8).
211 Id. at *39-40.
212 Id. at *42-43.
213 Id. at *42. The court determined that the controller had no duty to provide
notifications of altitude deviations of less than 300 feet. Id. Whether the control-
ler had a duty to notify the flight of "brief deviations of 300 feet or greater de-
pends on a variety of considerations, including whether a reasonable air
controller should have observed those deviations." Id. The court did not resolve
the question for purposes of summary judgment. Id. at *42-43.
214 Id. at *43-44. The court rejected the plaintiffs' theory that the aircraft's
altimeter might have malfunctioned and that that malfunction might have been
brought to the pilot's attention through a notification of altitude deviation. The
court noted that the stipulated facts showed that the air traffic controller had
issued altimeter readings to the flight several times and that the flight had prop-
erly established its altitude on both approaches. Id.
215 Id. at *49, *51.
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sary, "216 noting that "[p]ilots are instructed to switch to the com-
mon frequency as soon as practicable when approaching a non-
towered airport for a variety of reasons related to public
safety."2 1  Given this, the court could not "credit as a matter of
law the opinions of Plaintiffs' expert that [the air traffic control-
ler] had a duty to ignore these regulations and maintain [the
flight] on the ATC frequency during the second missed
approach."
Since the air traffic controller had properly transferred the
flight to the common traffic advisory frequency, there could be
no duty to issue safety alerts or instructions during the second
approach. 21 1 "Radar service had. . . been properly and automat-
ically terminated" well before the aircraft approached terrain;
the "controllers no longer had the ability to issue any alerts"
since the aircraft was no longer on ATC frequency; and "there
was nothing necessarily improper about [the flight]'s descent
[toward the runway] that should have prompted air controllers
to issue a safety alert even had they maintained their ability to
do sO."1220 The plaintiffs' theory that the air traffic controllers
had a duty to instruct the pilot to follow proper missed-ap-
proach procedures221 failed for the same reason: the air traffic
controller no longer had the ability to instruct the flight.2 2 2
Also, "there was nothing foreseeable about [the pilot's] actions
after the second missed approach."2 2 3
D. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
1. Hertz v. United State224
The plaintiff, the widow of a pilot who died in the crash of an
amateur-built experimental airplane, filed an administrative
claim with the FAA more than two years after the accident. 225
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs subsequent lawsuit be-
216 Id. at *46.
217 Id. at *45.
218 Id. at *48.
219 Id. at *51-52.
220 Id. at *51-52.
221 Id. at *52-53. Rather than execute the missed-approach procedure follow-
ing the second approach, the pilot circled and attempted to land from the oppo-
site direction. Id. at *19.
222 Id. at *53.
223 Id.
224 560 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2009).
225 Id. at 617-18.
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cause her claim had not been submitted in writing to the appro-
priate federal agency within the two-year time period prescribed
by 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b).226 The plaintiff argued that her claim
was timely because her two-year time period should run not
from the date of the accident but from when, about a month
later, she "telephoned the NTSB's Investigator-in-Charge, who
told her that 'the NTSB believed that the cause of the accident
was related to air traffic controller negligence.'" 2 2 7
The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed that 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b) is an
inquiry-notice rule. 2 28 Thus, a plaintiff need not "discover[ ] the
existence of a claim" in order for the clock to begin running,
but needs only be put on notice to conduct further inquiry.2 2 9
The court rejected the plaintiffs analogy to medical malpractice
cases "in which the plaintiff has little reason to suspect anything
other than natural causes for his injury . . . . Plane crashes by
their nature typically involve negligence somewhere in the causal
chain; and the mere fact of the event is thus typically enough to
put the plaintiff on inquiry notice of his claim." 3 o
IV. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958-
MANUFACTURER LIABILITY
A. HAr v. BOEING CO. 231
The plaintiffs in Hart were passengers who were injured when
Continental Airlines Flight 1404 veered off the runway at Den-
ver International Airport on December 20, 2008.232 They
brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colo-
rado, contending that defendant Boeing's 757's "directional
control mechanisms [were] designed in such a way that make it
difficult for pilots in a high crosswind situation to maintain run-
way heading during takeoff."2 3 3 Boeing argued that the Federal
Aviation Act preempted the plaintiffs' claims."3 The alleged
preemption at issue was implied field preemption.3
226 Id. at 618.
227 Id. at 617, 619.
228 Id. at 618 (citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120 (1979)).
229 Id.
230 Id. at 619.
231 No. 09-397, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117766, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 23, 2009).
232 Id. at *5.
233 Id.
234 Id. at *5-6.
235 Id. at *11-12.
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As the district court noted, the rule in the Tenth Circuit-
found in Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp. 236-is that the Federal
Aviation Act does not impliedly preempt "a state law claim for
negligence in the design of an aircraft." 2 3  Boeing argued that
the Tenth Circuit's precedent in Cleveland had been under-
mined by the Supreme Court's more recent decision in Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co. 23 1 More specifically, in Cleveland, the
Tenth Circuit had relied on the presence of the Federal Avia-
tion Act's savings clause and the presence of an express preemp-
tion provision governing rates and routes but not aircraft
safety.239 In Geier, the Supreme Court stated that "the saving
clause (like the express pre-emption provision) does not bar the
ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles."24
The district court in Hart concluded that this language in
Geier applied to conflict preemption-not implied field preemp-
tion.2 4 1 Although the court acknowledged that some language
in another Tenth Circuit decision, Choate v. Champion Home
Builders Co., 242suggested that Geier's reasoning might apply to im-
plied field preemption as well, it ultimately concluded that it was
bound to follow the Tenth Circuit's rule finding no field pre-
emption of state law claims for negligence in the design of an
aircraft. In parting, the district court observed: " [T] he Tenth
Circuit appears to be an outlier in this area of the law, and other
federal circuits courts have taken an arguably more nuanced ap-
proach to the issue of implied preemption under the FAA."244
V. COMBAT ACTIVITIES EXCEPTION APPLIED TO
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS
A. GETZ V. BOEING CO. 245
This case arose out of the crash of a U.S. Army Chinook heli-
copter in Afghanistan in 2007.246 The plaintiffs, survivors of the
crash and the heirs of those killed in the crash, brought suit in
236 985 F.2d 1438, 1444 (10th Cir. 1993).
237 Hart, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117766, at *8.
238 529 U.S. 861 (2000); Hart, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117766, at *10-11.
239 See Hart, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117766, at*7-8, *9-10.
240 Geier, 529 U.S. at 869; Hart, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117766, at *11.
241 Hart, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117766, at *10, *12.
242 222 F.3d 788, 793-94 (10th Cir. 2000).
243 Hart, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117766, at *12.
244 Id.
245 No. 07-06396, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18815, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2009).
246 Id. at *4.
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the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
against The Boeing Company, Honeywell International, Inc.,
and Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Systems, Inc., companies
which designed, manufactured, and tested the accident
helicopter.2 4 7
The defendants argued that they had immunity from suit as
government contractors manufacturing military equipment,
based on the Ninth Circuit case Koohi v. United States.2 48 Koohi
held that the combat activities exception to the FTCA also pre-
empted the common law tort claim against the private-party
weapons manufacturer defendant in that case. 2 4 9 The Getz
court, however, disagreed that Koohi stands for a broad proposi-
tion of government contractor immunity for military
equipment.250
Rather, the district court distinguished Koohi because it
turned on "whether the purposes of tort law would be furthered
by requiring weapons manufacturers to extend a duty of care to
'enemy forces or persons associated with those forces.'" 2 51 Getz,
however, concerned "extending the duty of care to United
States servicemen, the people the helicopter was designed to
protect. The lack of a duty of care owed to enemies in war does
not apply to our own military personnel." 2 2 Accordingly, the
court rejected the defendants' claim of immunity under the
combat activities exception. 5 3
VI. DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT
The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) provides a statu-
tory basis for the recovery of damages for wrongful death, in-
cluding "loss of care, comfort, and companionship" of the
deceased where the death occurs "on the high seas 3 nautical
miles from the shore of the United States." 2 5 4 DOHSA was
amended in 2000 to make it inapplicable to commercial aviation
accidents "occurring on the high seas 12 nautical miles or less
247 Id. at *4-5.
248 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992); Getz, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18815, at *15.
249 Getz, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18815, at *13-14; see also Koohi, 976 F.2d at
1336-37.
25o Getz, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18815, at *15.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id. at *19.
25 46 U.S.C. §§ 30302, 30307 (2006).
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from the shore of the United States,"5 thus leaving state law to
apply to such accidents. 25 6 The 2000 amendments also provided
for recovery of nonpecuniary damages-which are not recover-
able under the main provisions of the DOHSA-for deaths re-
sulting from "commercial aviation accident[s] occurring on the
high seas beyond 12 nautical miles from the shore of the United
States." 25 7  Punitive damages remain unavailable under
DOHSA.25
A. EBERLI v. CIRRus DESIGN CoRP.2 11
In Eberli, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida addressed the meaning of the phrase "commercial avia-
tion accident" in the 2000 amendments to the DOHSA. 26 0 The
decedent pilot had been contracted to fly a new Cirrus SR 20 to
its purchaser, a Cirrus customer located in Thailand.2 6 ' The air-
craft crashed into the Atlantic Ocean near Greenland.2 6 2
The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on the is-
sue of whether the 2000 "commercial aviation accident" amend-
ments to DOHSA applied to the crash, such that she could
recover for nonpecuniary damages.26 3 The plaintiff argued that
since ferrying the aircraft to the customer was "part of a com-
mercial activity carried out for profit and related to commerce,"
it met the meaning of "commercial aviation accident" within the
amendment.2 6 4 The defendants maintained that a commercial
aviation accident is "an accident that occurs during the trans-
portation of passengers or cargo for commercial purposes. "265
Finding the statutory term "commercial aviation accident"
ambiguous, the court turned to extrinsic material to determine
its meaning.2 6 6 The court looked primarily to 49 U.S.C. § 40125
of the transportation code which defines "commercial purposes"
255 Pub. L. No. 106-181, tit. IV, § 404(b), 114 Stat. 131 (2000) (codified as
amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30307 (2006)).
256 46 U.S.C. § 30308(a) ("This chapter does not affect the law of a State regu-
lating the right to recover for death.").
257 Id. § 30307(b) (emphasis added).
258 Id.
259 615 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
260 Id. at 1372-73.
261 Id. at 1371.
262 Id.
263 Id.; see 46 U.S.C. § 30307(b).
26 Eberli, 615 F. Supp. 2d at 1372.
265 Id. at 1373.
266 Id.
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as "the transportation of persons or property for compensation
or hire."2 6 7 The court also considered the legislative history of
the 2000 DOHSA amendments, specifically noting that the pro-
visions were "enacted in the aftermath of a number of interna-
tional air disasters and the lawsuits arising out of such disasters,
in which the families of the victims were denied loss of society
damages under DOHSA."2 68 The court also found relevant that
the accident aircraft had Operating Limitations prohibiting it
"from being operated to carry passengers or property for com-
pensation or hire."12 6  Based on these factors, the court con-
cluded that the crash at issue was not a "commercial aviation
accident," and therefore, the provisions of DOHSA governing
"commercial aviation accidents" did not apply to the plaintiffs
claims.27 0
B. HELMAN v. ALCOA GLOBAL FASTENERS INC. 271
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
was faced in Helman with determining "what distance from shore
DOHSA becomes applicable" to the crash of a military helicop-
ter off the California coast.2 7 2 The court rejected the approach
taken by the Second Circuit in In re Air Crash Off Long Island,
New York, on July 17, 1996,7 which found that DOHSA became
applicable where U.S. territorial waters ended (at the time,
twelve miles from shore) .274 Instead, the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California endorsed the position taken by
then-Judge Sotomayor in her dissent in In re Air Crash Off Long
Island.2 7 5 It held that, except in the case of a commercial avia-
tion accident, DOHSA applies to all deaths occurring beyond a
marine league (three nautical miles) from the shore of any
state.2 76
267 Id.
268 Id. at 1374.
269 Id. at 1371, 1373.
270 Id. at 1373-74.
271 No. 09-1353, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64720, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 2009).
272 Id. at *3.
273 In reAir Crash Off Long Island, N.Y., on July 17, 1996, 209 F.3d 200, 213-14
(2d Cir. 2000).
274 Helman, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 64720, at *5-6.
275 Id. at *6-7, *11.
276 Id. at *14-15.
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VII. CHOICE OF LAW
A. U.S. AVIATION UNDERWRITERS, INC. V. PILATUS
BusINEss AJRcRAFT LTD. 27 7
The manufacturers of a Pilatus PC-12/45 single-engine turbo-
prop and its engines appealed a jury verdict from the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Colorado finding them 49% at
fault for the aircraft's crash into the Sea of Okhotsk during an
evaluation and demonstration flight.278 The plaintiffs were
deemed 51% at fault by the jury.279 The Tenth Circuit upheld
the lower court's decision not to apply admiralty law because
"the activity of flying for the purpose of aircraft evaluation and
demonstration bears no relationship to a traditional maritime
activity. "280
The Tenth Circuit, however, overturned the jury verdict on
several grounds, the primary of which was the failure to apply
Idaho's modified comparative fault statute-which "disallows re-
covery in product liability actions if the plaintiff bears greater
responsibility for the injury than the defendants"-instead of
Colorado's comparative fault statute.28 1
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's application of
Colorado choice of law rules-the most significant relationship
test from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 8 In
this case, several of the common contacts used to determine
which jurisdiction has the most significant relationship to an avi-
ation accident had no application.2 8 3 "The accident occurred
over international waters and the airplane was manufactured
and designed in Canada and Switzerland, so neither the place of
the accident nor the conduct of the Defendants favors one state
over the other."284 The court then turned to the conduct of the
plaintiffs: "The trip was arranged and conducted by an Idaho
company. The plane and pilot were based in Idaho."28 5 Col-
277 582 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2009).
278 Id. at 1136.
279 Id. at 1138.
280 Id. at 1136.
281 Id. at 1136, 1143 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 145(1) (1971)).
282 Id. at 1143.
283 Id. at 1141.
284 Id. at 1144.
285 Id.
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rado's contacts, on the other hand, were limited and not related
to the accident.286
The appellate court also rejected the argument that 'justified
expectations" favored application of Colorado law since the case
had been primarily litigated up until trial under Colorado
law. It explained that this "primarily refers to the expecta-
tions of parties in their pre-litigation conduct, and this principle
is of little or no importance in the field of torts."288 Likewise,
the court rejected the argument that the defendants had waived
their right to application of Idaho law based on their failure to
amend an interrogatory directed toward what law the defend-
ants contended applied.28 9 Notification of their intent in the
pretrial order was deemed sufficient. 2 1o
The Tenth Circuit also determined that the district court
abused its discretion in admitting evidence of other, dissimilar
in-flight shutdowns of engines in Pilatus airplanes. 29' The appel-
late court applied a "substantial similarity" test to determine
whether other incidents may be admitted as evidence in a prod-
uct liability case.2 92 It found that "none of the other incidents
involved any of the causes" alleged by the plaintiffs to have
caused the crash in the instant case.2 9 3
It was also error, according to the appellate court, for the dis-
trict court to allow experts to testify about the meaning of a
"straightforward" Federal Aviation Regulation, 14 C.F.R.
§ 23.903(e) (3).294
B. JOHNSON v. Avco CORP. 2 95
In this case, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri applied Missouri choice-of-law rules-the most signifi-
cant relationship test from the Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws-to determine the law that applied to a wrongful
286 Id. The aircraft had been purchased by the plaintiffs from a Colorado




289 Id. at 1145.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 1147.
292 Id. at 1147-48.
293 Id. at 1149.
-4 Id. at 1150-51.
295 No. 07-1695, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108600, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 20, 2009).
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death action arising from the fatal crash of a small airplane in
Indiana."9
The manufacturer defendants argued that the law of the
place of the injury, Indiana, should apply in this action.2 9 7 The
plaintiffs, who alleged defective design and maintenance of the
accident aircraft's engines, claimed that Missouri law should ap-
ply since some of the defendants' alleged misconduct took place
there.2 9 8 Other alleged misconduct occurred in Pennsylvania
and Colorado.29 9 The Second Restatement calls for the applica-
tion of the law of the state of injury "unless some other state has
a more significant relationship" under the principles enumer-
ated in the Restatement. 0 0
The court performed separate analysis to determine what law
should apply to the issues of liability, compensatory damages,
and punitive damages. 0' Since the injury and the alleged mis-
conduct took place in different states, the court considered
which state had the greatest interest in regulating the miscon-
duct for purposes of determining the law applicable to liability
issues.2 While the court acknowledged that all four jurisdic-
tions had some interest in regulating the conduct at issue, Indi-
ana had the greatest interest, especially since the decedents
were Indiana residents."o
Indiana law applied to issues of compensatory damage be-
cause "the state of the injured plaintiffs residence has the great-
est interest in applying its law to ensure the plaintiff is
compensated for his injuries. "30' The court recognized that the
proper choice of law analysis for determining which state's puni-
tive damages law should apply was a question of first impression
in the Eighth Circuit.o' The court considered all of the inter-
ested states' policies toward punitive damages. 306 Every state but
Missouri prohibited the recovery of such damages. 07 Thus, the
296 Id. at *6-7.
-7 Id. at *4.
298 Id.
2- Id. at *10.
30 Id. at *8 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs § 175
(1971)).
301 Id. at *12-23.
302 Id. at *14-16.
3 Id. at *15.
3o4 Id. at *16.
305 Id. at *17-18.
306 Id. at *22.
3o7 Id.
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court found Missouri and the other states to be in absolute con-
flict regarding application of punitive damages." In this cir-
cumstance, the court stated that no state had a greater interest
in applying its law to the issue of punitive damages. 3 0 9 Thus, the
court returned to application of the law of the place of injury.1 0
VIII. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
A. VIvAs v. BOEING CO.31 1
Survivors and representatives of decedents killed in a crash
near Pucalpa, Peru brought suit in Illinois state court against
Boeing, which manufactured the aircraft, and United Technolo-
gies Corporation, which manufactured the aircraft's engine.1
The defendants brought a forum non conveniens motion for
dismissal in favor of an action in Peru. 13 The trial court denied
the motion, and the appellate court affirmed.3 1 4
The court summarized that: "all of the evidence relevant to
the design, manufacture and assembly of the aircraft and its en-
gines is in the United States" and "a significant portion of the
evidence regarding the crash is also in the United States, as a
result of the participation of the American defendants and
American authorities in the investigation of the crash by the Pe-
ruvian government," but "a significant portion of the crash evi-
dence is likely to be still in Peru.""3 1
In reviewing the factors relevant to the forum non conveniens
analysis and the district court's balancing of those factors, the
Appellate Court of Illinois made several interesting observa-
tions. The court generally focused on the convenience and in-
terests of litigation in the United States (rather than in Illinois
specifically) versus litigation in Peru. For example, when assess-
ing the availability of evidence relevant to the design, manufac-
ture, and assembly of the aircraft, the court weighed the
availability of evidence in the United States, rather than specifi-
cally in Illinois.' 16 Similarly, in analyzing which jurisdiction had
the greater interest in the litigation, it compared the interests of
308 Id.
309 Id.
o10 Id. at *22-23.
311 911 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).




316 Id. at 1069.
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the United States (noting only that "Illinois's interest in these
cases is not unrelated to the interest of the United States as a
whole") with the interests of Peru.1 Specifically, the court
stated:
[P]roduct liability actions are not "localized" cases; they are cases
"with international implications." Americans, no less than
Peruvians, have a specific interest in the safety of the Boeing
Model 737 aircraft which fly in our skies. While Peru certainly
has an interest in protecting the people who travel in its skies and
in determining damages for people injured or killed on its
flights, defendants Boeing and UTC are American corporations,
and Americans have an interest in ensuring the safety of the
products that its corporations build and ship throughout the
world, particularly when one of those corporations has its world
headquarters here. 1 s
The court also emphasized that when reviewing convenience,
the defendants must show that the chosen forum is inconve-
nient to them-not to the plaintiffs.3 1 9 The court discounted
the location of documentary evidence "in the modern age of
email, internet, telefax, copying machines and world-wide deliv-
ery services."3 20
Finally, the court questioned the motives of the defendants in
seeking the forum non conveniens transfer:
While the defendants have had the opportunity to participate in
the initial investigation, and collect evidence and record find-
ings, plaintiffs now have to play catch-up. When defendants, by
the account of their own engineers and employees, had appar-
ently full and immediate access to evidence in the foreign forum,
it seems disingenuous for them now to argue that they would
lack access to evidence if litigation proceeded here. Defendants
already had possession and control of the design evidence. It is
also disingenuous for defendants to claim now that the United
States has little interest in this tragedy, as they are well aware of
the American authorities and corporations that dominated the
accident investigation.3 2 1
317 Id. at 1071-72.
318 Id. at 1071.
319 Id. at 1069.
320 Id. at 1070.
321 Id. at 1072.
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B. KING V. CESSNA AIRCRAFT CO. 3 22
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the proper forum for lawsuits
against Cessna Aircraft Co. arising out the 2001 Milan airport
disaster.12 1 Plaintiff King brought suit as personal representative
of a U.S. citizen in the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida.124 After that, sixty-nine European plaintiffs
brought suit in the same court, and the cases were consoli-
dated.325 The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the forum non con-
veniens dismissal of the claims of the European plaintiffs. 326
The Court of Appeals emphasized that its review was for "clear
abuse of discretion" and that it would be improper for it to sub-
stitute its own judgment for that of the district court.2
The court proceeded to review the district court's findings
with a light touch. The district court properly determined that
"Italy [was] an available forum because Cessna [was] willing to
submit to jurisdiction and [was] amenable to process there."2
The court reviewed the district court's weighing of private fac-
tors, which the lower court had found to be "in or near equi-
poise." 32 The European plaintiffs specifically challenged the
court's analysis that a foreign plaintiffs choice of forum is enti-
tled to less deference than a domestic plaintiffs choice.330 They
pointed out that the majority of them were from countries with
treaties that accorded them with "no less favorable" access to
U.S. courts than a U.S. citizen is entitled to.3" The Eleventh
Circuit rejected this argument, stating that the analysis is ulti-
mately about the convenience of the parties, not about citizen-
ship per se. 2  The court compared the lesser deference
afforded to non-citizens to that which would be afforded to U.S.
citizens living abroad, noting that it could assume both were not
choosing the U.S. forum for convenience. 3 The appellate
322 562 F.3d 1374 (11th Cir. 2009).
323 Id. at 1377.
324 Id. at 1378.
325 Id.
326 Id. at 1377.
327 Id. at 1381.
328 Id. at 1382.
329 Id. at 1382-84.
3o Id. at 1382.
331 Id.




court likewise endorsed the district court's analysis of public in-
terest factors.'
The Eleventh Circuit modified the district court's dismissal or-
der to require that Cessna submit to jurisdiction, to waive the
statute of limitations, and to provide that any of the consoli-
dated cases might be reinstated should the Italian courts refuse
jurisdiction.
C. MELGARES v. SIKORSKY AiRcRAFT CORP. 33 6
The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut dis-
missed on forum non conveniens grounds a consolidated prod-
uct liability action arising out of the crash of a Sikorsky S-16N
helicopter into the Atlantic Ocean near Spain on July 8, 2006.
All of the plaintiffs in the action and all of the decedents they
represented were Spanish citizens.3 38  The defendants-the
manufacturer of the helicopter, Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., and its
parent corporation, United Technologies Corporation-were
U.S. corporations, and the helicopter was manufactured in
Connecticut.3 9
Assessing the deference to give to the plaintiffs choice of fo-
rum, the district court focused on the inconvenience of the Dis-
trict of Connecticut for the plaintiffs, stating:
[T]his court is bound by the Second Circuit's instruction that,
"when [a] foreign plaintiff chooses a United States forum, a plau-
sible likelihood exists that the selection was made for forum-
shopping reasons, such as the perception that United States
courts award higher damages than are common in other coun-
tries." Consequently, this court recognizes that the plaintiffs
likely have a pecuniary interest in having this dispute adjudicated
in the United States, and this interest was likely a factor in their
decision to bring suit in the District of Connecticut.340
As a result, the plaintiffs were entitled to less deference in their
choice of forum."
4 Id. at 1384.
335 Id.
336 613 F. Supp. 2d 231 (D. Conn. 2009).
3 Id. at 235.
3 Id. at 241.
3s9 Id. at 235, 237.
30 Id. at 242-45 (citing Norex Petroleum, Ltd. v. Access Indus., 416 F.3d 146,
155 (2d Cir. 2005)).
341 Id.
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Examining the private factors at play, the court was principally
concerned that the entities responsible for maintaining the heli-
copter-which the defendants asserted were responsible for the
crash-were not amenable to process in the United States.3 4 2
The defendants, on the other hand, had unequivocally submit-
ted to jurisdiction in Spain.3 4 3 The court considered that the
defendants had "already produced thousands of pages related to
the S-61N" and that "these documents were produced on com-
pact disc which can be transported to Spain quite easily."" The
court likewise concluded that the public interest factors favored
litigation in Spain primarily because it concluded that Spain had
a greater interest in the litigation and because Spanish law
would likely apply in the case. 4 5
D. FREDRIKSSON v. SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT CORP.346
Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. was successful in another forum non
conveniens motion in the District of Connecticut in Fredrik-
sson.3 4 7 This case arose out of the crash of a Finland-based Sikor-
sky S-76C+ helicopter into Estonian territorial waters." The
plaintiffs, as well as their decedents, were citizens of the Repub-
lic of Finland.3 49 The defendants were U.S. corporations, based
in either Connecticut or California.5 o
Like Melgares, this case also included issues related to the heli-
copter's maintenance, this time in Finland.3 5 Further, al-
though the accident occurred in the territorial waters of Estonia
and the defendant's alleged negligence occurred in the United
States, the court concluded that it was likely that the law of Fin-
land would apply to the case, focusing on the alleged negligence
of the helicopter's maintainers, among other factors.35 2 In an
analysis ultimately quite similar to that conducted in Melgares,
the court granted the defendants forum non conveniens
motion. 53
342 Id. at 247.
s4 Id.
3- Id. at 246.
45 Id. at 249, 251-52.
346 No. 08-450, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89443, at *1 (D. Conn. Sept. 2, 2009).
3 Id. at *3.
34 Id. at *2, *6.
349 Id. at *10.
350 Id. at *10-11.
551 Id. at *22; see supra Part VII.C.
352 Id. at *59-62.
353 Id. at *63-66.
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